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Abstract 
With the advent of globalization, economic and financial interactions among countries 
have become widespread. Given technological advancements, the factors of production 
can no longer be considered to be just labor and capital. In the pursuit of economic 
growth, every country has sensibly invested in international cooperation, learning, 
innovation, technology diffusion and knowledge, and outward direct investment. In this 
paper, we use a panel data set of 40 countries from 1981 to 2008 and a negative binomial 
model, using a novel set of cross-border patents and joint patents as proxy variables for 
technology diffusion, in order to investigate such diffusion. The empirical results 
suggest that, if it is desired to shift from foreign to domestic technology, it is necessary 
to increase expenditure on R&D for business enterprises and higher education, exports 
and technology. If the focus is on increasing bilateral technology diffusion, it is 
necessary to increase expenditure on R&D for higher education and technology. It is 
also found that outward foreign direct investment has no significant impact on either 
joint or cross-border patents, whereas inward foreign direct investment has a significant 
negative impact on cross-border patents but no impact on joint patents. Moreover, 
government expenditure on higher education has a significant impact on both 
cross-border and joint patents. 
Keywords: International Technology Diffusion, Exports, Imports, Joint Patent, 
Cross-border Patent, R&D, Negative Binomial Panel Data. 
JEL: F14, F21, O30, O57. 
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1. Introduction 
 
   With advances in technology and communications, the boundaries between countries 
have become blurred. In the increasingly globalized market, multinational corporations 
are, through free trade and foreign direct investment, exchanging capital, goods, 
services and knowledge across borders. As a result, countries have become increasingly 
dependent economically on each other, as both enterprises and the countries themselves 
form competitive and cooperative relationships. For these reasons, to remain 
competitive in international markets, multinational companies are actively engaging in 
technology reform and innovation at the international level. This means that the key 
elements of business growth comprise not only traditional capital, equipment and labor, 
but also knowledge and the ability to employ and innovate in the area of  technology. In 
the current globalized economic environment, these factors are of considerable 
importance to increasing business productivity and international competitiveness. 
As each country has different levels of expertise and knowledge, multinational 
enterprises engage in international cooperation to acquire innovation technology and 
knowledge. By keeping their costs of research and development (R&D) relatively low, 
they are enhancing their ability to adapt to international markets . In order to achieve the 
effects of technological progress, these enterprises are making every effort to acquire 
technology and to innovate. Thus, the competition taking place among economic 
activities at the international level indirectly results in the international spread of 
technology. In addition to the technology spillovers occurring as a result of the 
technology embodied in the trade in goods and services, these international technology 
spillover channels also include technology spillovers arising from purchases and sales of 
 3 
 
disembodied technology. 
Technology diffusion can also be referred to as knowledge spillover. When defining 
knowledge and technology, it can be difficult to distinguish between them. Knowledge is 
typically produced by universities and research institutions. After application in the 
market place, and undergoing research and development, if knowledge has any 
economic value, it can then be called technology. At this point, knowledge will be able 
to contribute to a country’s economic growth. 
In the current economic environment, a country’s ability to innovate has become an 
important factor in enhancing business productivity and national economic growth. The 
higher is the degree of national innovation, the more developed will be the technology 
and knowledge that the country itself owns. However, through international cooperation, 
a country may possibly obtain greater resources to enhance economic growth. In this 
paper, we use patent cooperation as an indicator to measure international cooperation. 
This paper uses patent data to evaluate international innovation activities in order 
to obtain a technology diffusion trajectory. Patents constitute the output of a country’s 
innovation activities. As patents are knowledge or technology for which application is 
made, and approval is obtained from the patent authorities, others do not have the right 
to steal them or engage in plagiarism in relation to them. In this sense, patents have 
economic value. Based on the premise that patents are the output of innovation, patents 
can be used to measure a country’s creativity. In particular, by means of the information 
provided by the patent documents, it is possible to investigate the trajectory of 
technology flows in the process of innovation. In this way, it can be determined whether 
innovation is diffused through R&D cooperation, or through the movement of 
technology across borders, or from one enterprise to another. In addition, innovation 
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may be influenced by outward or inward foreign direct investment. 
Based on the above, this paper analyses the international technology spillover 
effects for merchandise trade through embodied technology, as well as those effects 
based on the trade in disembodied technology. We use different patent characteristics to 
examine the effect of international spillovers for a sample of 40 countries, which are 
classified as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries and non-OECD countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
the literature on embodied technology diffusion and disembodied technology diffusion. 
Section 3 presents the variables, data and sample statistics for the empirical analysis, 
Section 4 discusses the research methods and empirical model, Section 5 introduces the 
empirical results, and Section 6 provides concluding remarks and some suggestions for 
future research. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
 
Technological spillovers can be used to advantage by enterprises, which will then 
generate positive external effects (Norman and Pepall, 2004). This will lead to an entire 
batch of enterprises within the cluster achieving technological progress, t o changes in 
product design, and to production systems being upgraded or to the development of new 
customer-based results. In discussing the main channels of technology spillovers, Keller 
(2001) indicates that the primary channels are international trade and foreign direct 
investment, and that it is through such international trade and foreign investment 
behavior that a country will promote the international flow of technology. In addition, 
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international technology spillovers are effective for enhancing the  productivity of less 
developed countries. Moreover, the use of technology spillover externalities depends 
mainly on the countries themselves being able to understand and explain the knowledge 
and technology (Mancusi, 2008). This means that education is extremely important for 
human capital (see also Cassia and Colombelli (2008); Carr et al. (2001)). 
In the following review of the literature, we focus on three main channels of 
technology diffusion in relation to merchandise trade, technology trade and individual 
learning capability. 
 
2.1 Embodied technology diffusion 
The earliest research on international trade and technology diffusion was by 
Coe and Helpman (1995), whose research indicated that international trade and 
technology diffusion are strongly linked. Based on economic growth theory, they 
used pooled time series cross-sectional data for 1971-1990 for 21 OECD 
countries plus Israel, and used R&D capital stock to denote the flow of 
technology. The empirical results indicated that productivity and the flow of 
technology are indeed closely linked, and that the flow of technology and the 
composition of imports (with imports arising from high-knowledge or 
low-knowledge countries) are positively related. The larger the share of imports, 
the more significant is the relationship so that, in more open economies, the 
influence of foreign R&D on productivity is greater. 
Following the Coe and Helpman (1995), many studies have discussed their 
results in detail. Research that focused the impact of industrialized countries’ 
R&D investment on the productivity of relatively less developed countries was 
 6 
 
examined by Coe et al. (1997, 2008). They use human capital to denote the flow 
of technology, but did not consider domestic R&D capital stock (as the domestic 
R&D stock of developing countries is relatively small, it can safely be ignored). 
Their empirical results from several developing countries confirm the results that 
foreign R&D spillovers are positively related to a country’s total factor 
productivity. 
Subsequently, Keller (1998) used counterfactual estimation to examine Coe 
and Helpman’s (1995) conclusion regarding the importance of trade to 
international technology diffusion. The counterfactual estimation included using 
Monte Carlo experiments to estimate the trading partner’s randomly assigned 
share of bilateral imports. This share of imports was, in turn, used as a weight to 
calculate the foreign R&D capital stock1, which was then used to simulate the 
data and perform a comparison with the results estimated by Coe and Helpman 
(1995).  
The results of the empirical analysis indicated that, by using the randomly 
generated share of imports of the trading partner to serve as weights, the output 
elasticity of the spillovers of the foreign R&D stock was greater than the share of 
real imports used to calculate the foreign R&D capital stock. Furthermore, using 
the share of imports to simulate the weight of the foreign R&D stock to explain 
changes in a country’s productivity led to superior results than those obtained by 
Coe and Helpman (1995), who used the shares of real imports as weights for their 
R&D results (which gave a relatively high 2R  value). These empirical findings 
                                                     
1 In Coe and Helpman (1995), the R&D capital stock is calculated by using the trading partner’s 
domestic R&D capital stock, with the share of imports as the weighted average of the weights. 
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indicate that using the estimated results of random data that are not related to 
international trade is superior to using real data.  
There are also studies that have used import data that do not consist of all 
imports of goods and services, but which classify imports according to different 
kinds of imports, such as using imports of machinery or capital goods to examine 
their impact on knowledge spillovers. Keller (2000) used data on imports of 
machinery goods and productivity for 1970-1990 for eight OECD countries to 
expand upon Keller (1998)’s counterfactual estimation. By conducting Monte 
Carlo experiments to estimate the trading partner’s randomly assigned bilateral 
import shares, Keller examines the impact of a country’s imports of intermediate 
goods on productivity. The empirical results indicate that, if the share of imports 
between countries is uniform, the share of imports is unlikely to have an 
important bearing on the diffusion of technology. However, if a country’s imports 
from a particular country account for a relatively large share of that country’s 
imports, the share of imports will have an influence on technology diffusion.  
Xu and Wang (1999) use panel data for 21 OECD countries for the 
1983-1990, with imports of capital goods reflecting the importance of 
international technology spillover channels. Their results indicate that, when only 
imports of capital goods and not the imports of all manufactured goods are taken 
into account, the combination of imports will have a relatively large influence on 
international technology spillovers. Therefore, doubts may be raised regarding 
the results that imports are important to the diffusion of technology. Eaton and 
Kortum (1996) use cross-sectional data for 19 OECD countries for 1986-1988, 
and develop a productivity and patent technology diffusion growth model to 
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explain the relative growth and productivity of the OECD countries. Their results 
indicate that, by controlling for distance and other influential factors, bilateral 
imports do not help in forecasting bilateral patent activity and indicators of 
international diffusion.  
Clerides et al. (1998) use plant-level data for Columbia (1981-1991), Mexico 
(1986-1990), and Morocco (1984-1990) to examine the causal relationship 
between exports and productivity to see whether enterprises that become 
exporters will enhance the efficiency of enterprise learning. Their results do not 
provide evidence that export-oriented enterprises can achieve a learning effect by 
exporting. 
Carr et al. (2001) argued that foreign direct investment frequently involves 
the transfer of technology between countries,  which means that international 
trade and foreign direct investment indeed play an important role in international 
technology diffusion.  
Recently, Chang et al. (2013) used triadic patents and single patents as proxy 
variables for innovation and a panel data for 37 countries for 1994-2005 to 
examine the impact of the main channels of international trade on domestic 
innovation. These channels are outward direct investment, inward direct 
investment, cross-border merges & acquisitions (M&A) by foreigners, R&D 
expenditure, exports and imports. Their empirical results indicated that exports 
promote domestic innovation activities, and thereby enhance the domestic 
technology level, but the effect of imports on domestic innovation activities was 
insignificant. They also showed that the impact of inward direct investment on 
domestic innovation was negative.  
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Overall, many empirical studies have confirmed Coe and Helpman’s (1995) 
hypothesis that foreign technology through trade serves as the channel for international 
technology spillovers for influencing the growth of total factor productivity (also see 
Lichtenberg et al. (1998); Branstetter (2001); Lee (2006); Woerter and Roper (2010); 
García et al .  (2013)).  
 
2.2 Disembodied technology diffusion 
Madsen (2007) uses data on technology imports and total factor productivity 
for 16 OECD countries for 1870-2004 to examine whether knowledge is 
disseminated through trade. The empirical results indicate that imports of 
technology and domestic knowledge have had a significant impact on total factor 
productivity over the past 135 years, and that 93% of the growth in total factor 
productivity growth over the past century has been due to technology imports. 
The focus of the literature on firm level data such as the recent work of 
Chang and Robin (2006), uses panel data for a total of 27,754 enterprises in 
Taiwan’s manufacturing sector for 1992-1995. It is found that, in most industries, 
R&D and technology imports frequently exhibit a complementary rather than a 
substituting relationship with each other. More recently, Chang and Robin (2012) 
examine the impact of R&D and technology imports on firm performance against 
the background of Taiwan’s manufacturing industry and industrial upgrading 
policy. They use the stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1992, 1995) 
to estimate a two-panel translog production function for 1992-1995 and 
1997-2003. Their empirical results show that in most industries the impact of 
knowledge input is relatively noticeable in the second panel (1997-2003), 
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indicating that the policy launched in 1991 to promote enterprise sales through 
innovation started to be effective in 1995. Thus, while innovation has become a 
key factor in improving sales, the impact of innovation can be interpreted 
differently in different industries. In traditional industries, the effect of 
innovation can be interpreted as the result of catching up with the world’s frontier 
technology. Moreover, in the electronics or high-tech industry, innovation has led 
to the emergence of a new era in Taiwan that is characterized by specialization 
and knowledge intensity. 
In a recent empirical study Hagedoor and Wang (2012) confirmed that 
internal  and external R&D, either through R&D alliances or acquisitions, are 
complementary innovation activities  at higher levels of in-house R&D 
investments. However,  at  lower levels of in-house R&D investment efforts,  
internal and external  R&D are observed to be substitute strategic options.  
 
2.3 Individual learning capability and technology diffusion  
    Due to different levels of development for each country, the ability to use 
and absorb knowledge can also vary. Mancusi (2008) used R&D data and 
European Patent Office (EPO) patent application data for 14 OECD countries for 
1978-2003 to examine how the productivity of less developed countries can be 
enhanced. The empirical findings indicated that international knowledge 
spillovers were effective in enhancing the productivity of less developed 
countries, and that using knowledge externalities resulting from international 
spillovers depended mainly on using the country’s understanding of and ability to 
explain external knowledge. Geroski, Machin and Van Reenen (1993) used panel 
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data for U.K. manufacturing for 1972-1983 and divided enterprises according to 
whether they were in innovative or non-innovative industries to examine the 
impact of major innovative activity on enterprise profitability. Their results 
indicated that the volume of innovation produced by enterprises had a positive 
impact on their profitability, but that the effect was not significant, on average. 
Innovative and non-innovative enterprises were consistently different from each 
other over the longer term in that innovative enterprises had a larger market share 
than non-innovative enterprises. Moreover, internally innovative enterprises were 
better able to understand and learn knowledge, giving them greater opportunities 
to benefit from receiving spillovers and also making them more competitive. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) used Federal Trade Commission R&D 
expenditure and sales data, and examined the traditional view that R&D takes 
place to “produce a product (new information)” with the enterprise as the unit. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) argue that R&D did not only exist to produce new 
information, but also to strengthen the enterprise’s ability to use and absorb 
currently-held information. Their results indicated that the difficulty or ease to 
learn knowledge within the industry had an effect on R&D expenditure, 
appropriability and technological opportunities, an outcome that differed from 
traditional results. In order to promote learning ability, one should stimulate R&D 
expenditure as, by stimulating R&D expenditure in this way, learning capabilities 
will increase, indicating that basic technical and scientific knowledge determine 
the ability to learn. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 12 
 
 
In this paper, 40 countries are considered for 1981-2008, with countries 
divided into OECD and non-OECD countries. As the OECD was established in 
1961, we divide the countries into those that joined as founding members in 1961 
and those that acceded to OECD later. Details of the countries comprising the 
sample and the year in which they joined the OECD are given in Table 1. 
 
< Table 1 goes here > 
 
Patents are the output of innovation activities. Patent cooperation can be 
used to measure the extent to which countries cooperate with each other in regard 
to innovation, and refers to the internationalization of the diffusion of knowledge 
and invention activities. Moreover, the international patent cooperation 
emphasized in this paper is concerned with the information contained within the 
patent documents, which indicates the names of the inventor and the applicant. In 
most cases, the applicant may be an enterprise, an organization, a university or a 
research office, and in some cases an individual. The applicant has ownership of 
the patent. The patent document includes the residential addresses of both the 
inventor and the applicant, and it is from this information that the nationality of 
the inventor and the applicant can be ascertained. If the inventor and the applicant 
are from different countries, it is possible to track the flow of knowledge 
internationally through both of these countries. According to the OECD (2008), 
the number of patents based on collaboration between inventors and applicants of 
different nationalities have accounted for an increasingly large share of all 
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patents in recent years. There are two main reasons for this, namely “creation of 
knowledge” and “search for knowledge”. 
We use the numbers of international patent cooperation as proxy variables of 
technology diffusion. Two types of international patent cooperation serve as 
dependent variables, namely Cross-border patents and Jointly-invented patents. 
Both types of international patent cooperation are the numbers of patents 
approved for 1981-2008 by the USPTO.2  
(a)  Cross-border patents (Cross patents): This refers to the number of patents 
owned by the home country that were invented by foreign inventors. That is, 
it refers to the number of patents that the patent applicants3 (patent owners) 
possess that were invented by foreign inventors. Cross-border patents are 
mainly the result of multinational enterprises engaging in international 
activities, such as where the applicant for a patent is a business group, while 
the inventor of the patent is an employee of one of the enterprise’s foreign 
subsidiaries. In such circumstances, the international trajectory of the 
technology and knowledge embodied in the patents can be tracked based  on 
the countries of residence of the applicant and the inventor of the patent, and 
the extent to which domestic enterprises control the foreign invention can be 
evaluated. This can motivate both countries in regard to internationalization 
and R&D activities, and so can serve as an indicator of patent cooperation.    
(b)  Jointly-invented patents (Joint patent): This refers to the number of patents 
in which the domestic inventor invented the patent with at least one foreign 
                                                     
2USPTO, United States Patent and Trademark Office . 
3 The patent applicant can be an enterprise, institution, university, research office or an 
individual.  
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inventor, as one approach to international cooperation. As the expertise and 
knowledge possessed by the inventors of different countries are not the same, 
searching for different kinds of knowledge takes place across borders to 
overcome the lack of resources for innovation. R&D cooperation among R&D 
personnel internationally can be found where enterprises enter into joint 
ventures with one another, or organizations cooperate (cooperation between 
universities or public research institutions), and hence indicate patent 
cooperation. An OECD (2008) research report observed that the share of this 
kind of patent cooperation rose from 5.8% in 1990 to 7% in 2005, and that the 
extent of the international cooperation among large countries and small 
countries was markedly different. In Belgium, the Czech Republic, Ireland, 
Hungary and Poland, cooperation patents invented as a result of cooperation 
with foreign countries accounted for more than 30% of patents. On average, 
small and less developed countries participated more actively in international 
cooperation compared to highly-developed countries, reflecting their need to 
overcome the problems associated with the small size of their internal 
markets and their lack of a technology R&D base. In large countries, the level 
of cooperation also varied. In France, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S.A., the 
proportions attributable to international cooperation ranged from 11% for the 
U.S.A. to 27% for the U.K. The shares of international cooperation for Japan 
and South Korea were relatively small. European countries exhibited a 
tendency to cooperate with other European countries. Australia, Canada, 
China, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and New Zealand, by and large, 
cooperated primarily with the U.S.A. 
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For international trade, we use imports as well as exports of goods and 
services of all domestic industries to examine the relationship between imports 
and exports of patents and international trade, and international investment. 
Chang, Chen, and McAleer (2010) conducted detailed research on the effects of 
foreign direct investment on triadic patents. This paper does not discuss foreign 
direct investment as an explanatory variable, but rather uses expenditure on and 
income from technology trade to measure the extent to which a country uses 
foreign technology and sells technology. For the innovation input, this study 
uses the country’s gross expenditure on R&D to measure the country’s R&D 
input. In addition, we also subdivide the country’s gross expenditure on R&D 
into three categories, namely government agencies’ expenditure on R&D, 
business organizations’ expenditure on R&D, and R&D expenditure by higher 
education. This will allow discussion of the R&D input in greater detail in 
different domains, as well as an analysis of the impact of expenditure on R&D 
on patents. Finally, in order to examine whether differences exist among OECD 
member countries, we also use a dummy variable.  
The details of the explanatory variables are given below and are summarized 
in Table 2: 
 
< Table 2 goes here > 
 
(a) Imports (Import): This is measured by each country’s foreign imports as a 
percentage of GDP. International trade is an important economic strategy of a 
country in relation to products that it is unable to produce itself, but which can 
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be imported, and which can also increase the competitiveness of homogeneous 
products in the country, and promote exchange between countries. 
(b) Exports (Export): This is measured by each country’s exports to countries 
abroad as a percentage of GDP. Through exports of goods, a country can have 
contact with foreign enterprises and gain new knowledge and technology. The 
country can also learn which types of technology domestic enterprises lack 
and, to increase its international competitiveness, can encourage domestic 
enterprises to engage in R&D. 
(c)  Expenditure on technology trade (TP): This is measured by the expenditure 
on technology trade as a percentage of GERD. It is defined as the amount 
expended on technology purchased from abroad (the technology input) 
through technological cooperation and technology licensing, which includes 
the following: 1. Patents (purchases and sales); 2. Patent licensing; 3. 
Expertise; 4. Model and design; 5. Trademarks. 6. Technical services; and 7. 
Enterprise R&D expenditure commissioned abroad. This variable can be 
measured through the international flows of knowledge acquired through 
technology licensing or direct purchases of knowledge. 
(d)  Income from technology trade (TR): This is measured by the income from 
technology trade as a proportion of GERD, and is defined as the income 
from technology obtained through technical cooperation and technology 
licensing and sold abroad (that is, exports of technology). [It consists of the 
same items and expenditure on technology trade as given in (c) above.] 
(e)  Inward foreign direct investment (FDI_in): This is measured as the amount 
of inward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. 
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(f)  Outward foreign direct investment (FDI_out): This is measured as the 
amount of outward foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP. 
(g)  Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD): This is measured by the gross 
domestic R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP. It refers to the total 
R&D expenditure of the domestic sector for one year, and includes each 
domestic sector’s foreign-funded R&D expenditure, but does not include 
payments made to fund R&D overseas. The total R&D expenditure can 
depict a country’s engagement in innovative research, as input indicators of 
innovative development. Domestic R&D expenditure can be decomposed 
into R&D expenditure for several sectors, including business enterprise 
R&D expenditure, government agencies’ R&D expenditure, higher 
education R&D expenditure and private non-profit R&D expenditure. 
However, due to data limitations, in this paper we have access to data for 
R&D expenditure for only the first three sectors discussed above, namely 
(h), (i) and (j), as outlined below. 
(h)  Business enterprise expenditure on R&D (BERD): This is measured by R&D 
expenditure by business enterprises as a percentage of GDP. 
(i)  Government agencies’ expenditure on R&D (GOVERD): This is measured by 
R&D expenditure by government agencies as a percentage of GDP. 
(j)  Higher education expenditure on R&D (HERD): This is measured by R&D 
expenditure by higher education as a percentage of GDP. 
(k)  Dummy variables are used to distinguish OECD countries from non-OECD 
countries. If a country is assigned a value of 1, it is an OECD country with a 
value of 0 indicating a non-OECD country. As the OECD was established in 
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1961, OECD countries can be classified into those countries that joined 
OECD as founding members in 1961 and those that joined the OECD later. 
The sample period in this paper is 1981-2008. 
The import and export data are obtained from the World Bank, while the data 
for patents, the volume of technology trade and R&D expenditure are sourced 
from the OECD, for 1981-2008.  
Tables 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables, and includes data for 
the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values. From Table 3, 
it can be seen that the standard deviations of the cross-border patents and 
jointly-invented patents are always greater than their corresponding means, 
indicating that the data are characterized by overdispersion.4 This is very closely 
related to our selection of the negative binomial model for estimation, which will 
be explained in detail below.  
 
< Table 3 goes here > 
 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the mean values of imports and exports as a 
proportion of GDP is in the region of 26%.5 This shows that, when international 
trade takes place frequently, the relationships between countries are likely to be 
very close. Expenditure on technology trade as a proportion of total domestic 
R&D expenditure is, on average, around 57%, while income from technology 
trade as a proportion of GERD is, on average, about 42%, indicating the existence 
                                                     
4 Overdispersion refers to the situation where the variance is greater than the mean. 
5 0.1490602 + 0.1163706 = 0.2654308. 
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of technology interdependence between countries. R&D expenditures for 
different sectors as a proportion of a country’s GDP are, in descending order, 
0.98% for business enterprise R&D expenditure, followed by 0.33% for higher 
education R&D expenditure, and finally 0.25% for R&D expenditure by 
government agencies. From these results, it can be inferred that a country’s 
innovation arises mainly from its business enterprise R&D, followed by R&D 
from universities or research institutions. 
 
4. Empirical Model  
 
The patent data used here consist of count data, the data type being panel 
data. The negative binomial model is chosen for estimation in this paper. Before 
estimation, it is necessary to pay attention to two limitations of the model, as 
given in below: 
(a)  The data used here are count data and overdispersion must exist. This means 
that the variances of the explanatory variables are greater than the 
corresponding means. From Table 4, it can be seen that, for the count data for 
each of the two patent variables, the variances are greater than their means, 
so that overdispersion exists. 
(b)  The problem of zero inflation is not inherent in the data. By zero inflation is 
meant that the count data are characterized by an excessive number of zeros, 
leading to bias in the estimated results. Table 4 lists the proportions of the 
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total observations for the three explanatory variables for which the 
observations are zero. It can be seen that zero observations account for only 
a very small share of the number of observations for each of the three 
variables. Therefore, the zero inflation issue is not a problem in the data set 
used here. 
< Table 4 goes here > 
 
4.1 Negative binomial fixed effects model  
    Hausman et al. (1984) argue that, when the type of data used consists of 
panel data, different results are obtained in developing the estimation model when 
the Poisson model and the negative binomial model are used for the relationship 
between patents and R&D expenditure. They conclude that, as the Poisson 
distribution is applicable to expected values and variances of the same data type, 
among the observed values it is very common for the variance to be greater than 
the mean, so that overdispersion is found to exist. For this reason, using the 
Poisson model for estimation is not appropriate. However, the negative binomial 
model for the relationship between patents and R&D expenditure can resolve the 
problem of overdispersion in the data. 
    First, let iitit  
~
, where i  is country i’s fixed effects which do not 
change over time. As can be seen from the above explanation,   follows a 
  , Gamma  distribution. Therefore, iitit  
~
 should follow a 






i
i
it ,amma


G  distribution. Furthermore, let the parameters be as shown in (1), 
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so that we can obtain the estimate it
~
  and its distribution, as given in (2), where 
i  and i  change due to the differences in countries. Given the condit ion  itn , 
we can derive the conditional probability density function itn )T,...,1(t   as 
shown in (3), where itn  is the number of patents for country i in year t. By 
substituting the definitions 

 it
it )n E(  and 
 
2
1
V

 
 itit )n(  into (1), we can 
obtain the variance and mean of the negative binomial fixed effects model, as 
shown in (4). The variance is larger than the mean, indicating that this model 
allows for the existence of overdispersion: 
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The likelihood function is given in (5), and the maximum likelihood approach is 
used to  estimate 

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4.2 Negative binomial random effects model 
The derivation of the random effects model is similar to that of the fixed 
effects model. The difference from the fixed effects model lies in 
i  in the 
random effects model being randomly distributed. Its probability density function 
can be expressed as )(g i , so that the joint probability density function of itn  
and )( ig   is given in (6): 
)(g)nPr(),n(r iitiit  P                                        (6) 
In order to derive the itn  probability density function, it is necessary to 
integrate the joint probability density function integral to remove i . Before 
integrating, it is necessary to determine the appropriate distribution of i . For 
convenience of estimation, we let   zii  1/ , as shown in (7), where z  
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conforms to a ),(   baBeta  distribution. Therefore, its probability density 
function is, as shown in (8). Based on the above, after integration the probability 
density function can be obtained as shown in (9), and its likelihood function is 
given in (10). Finally, we use the maximum likelihood approach to estimate 

 : 
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It is worth noting that the fixed effects and random effects models differ in that 
the random effects model requires that the two parameters a  and b  be 
estimated. 
The basic model presented in this paper is used to examine the impact of 
imports, exports, expenditure on technology trade, income from technology trade, 
domestic R&D expenditure, and dummy variables on cross-border patents and 
jointly-invented patents. The empirical model is as shown in (11) and (12), where 
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the dependent variables it  and it  are Cross patents and Joint patents, 
respectively, for country i in period t .  
In order to address the issue of possible endogeneity, we estimate equation 
(11) using lagged explanatory variables as instruments. However, it has been 
argued that lagged variables do not always serve as good instruments , and the 
estimated results may be sensitive to the choice of instruments. Accordingly, we 
also used other suitable instrumental variables. As lack of data is an issue which 
prevents use of an instrumental variables, we use lagged variables as instruments: 
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In order to lead to more informative empirical results, we divide domestic 
R&D expenditure into three kinds of expenditure, namely business enterprise 
R&D expenditure (BERD), government agencies’ R&D expenditure (GERD), and 
higher education R&D expenditure (HERD). This permits an examination the 
impacts of these different sectors’ R&D expenditure on patents.  
The empirical model is as shown in (13) and (14). The dependent variables 
it  and  it  are the average numbers of domestically-owned cross-border 
patents and patents jointly invented in foreign countries, respectively, for country 
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i in year t . Of the explanatory variables, L1_Import represents expenditure on 
imports lagged one period, L1_Export represents expenditure on exports lagged 
one period, L1_TBP_Payments represents expenditure on technology trade lagged 
one period, L1_TBP_Receipts represents income from technology trade lagged 
one period, L1_BERD represents the R&D expenditure of business enterprises 
lagged one period, L1_GOVERD represents the R&D expenditure of government 
agencies lagged one period, and L1_HERD represents the R&D expenditure of 
higher education lagged one period, where   is the parameter to be estimated: 
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    In this paper, we use the STATA statistical software for estimation, where the 
estimates of the marginal effects are based, for example, on the derivatives of the 
empirical model (11), namely *
portIm_L


1
1



, where 
*  is the mean of the 
dependent variables. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
The basic model adopted in this paper investigates the impact of imports, exports, 
technology trade expenditure, revenue from technology trade and domestic R&D 
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expenditure on patents. In order to avoid the problem of endogeneity, all variables are 
lagged by one period. In considering R&D expenditure, it is assumed that a country’s 
investment in R&D will not lead to innovation in the current period. Thus, it is 
necessary to decide on the number of periods by which R&D expenditure should be 
deferred. 
The correlation coefficients among the dependent and independent variable are 
given in Table 5. Although they do not appear in the same regression equation, it is not 
surprising that joint and cross-border patents are highly correlated at 0.995. None of the 
independent variables is individually highly correlated with either joint or cross -border 
patents. Among the independent variables, the highest correlations are between Imports 
and Exports (at 0.987), TR and TP (at 0.864), FDI_in and Exports (at 0.856), and FDI_in 
and Imports (at 0.850). 
 
< Table 5 goes here > 
 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of determining the number of periods by which 
R&D expenditure should be deferred using the negat ive binomial model, based on fixed 
and random effects for cross-border patents and jointly-invented patents. The two 
models use domestic R&D expenditure lagged one, two and three periods to examine 
which specification is better. The criterion on for superiority is based on statistical 
significance, with greater deemed to be better.  
The empirical results show that the use of domestic R&D expenditure lagged one 
period is the best for both cross-border (at 0.195 and 0.218 for fixed and random effects, 
respectively) and joint patents (at 0.176 and 0.201 for fixed and random effects, 
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respectively), indicating that the current domestic R&D will exhibit the effects of 
innovation in the following period. It is for this reason that in the following analysis, 
domestic R&D expenditure is always lagged one period.  
 
< Tables 6 and 7 go here > 
 
5.1 Results for cross-border patents 
The model is tested using the Hausman test, with the random effects model  as the 
null hypothesis, and the fixed effects model as the alternative hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis is not rejected. Therefore, cross-border patents in the basic model are 
explained by random effects, as given in column (2) in Tables 8-10. Cross-border 
patents refer to the number of patents that are domestically owned but invented by 
foreign inventors, most of which are the result of cooperation in innovation between  
domestic enterprises and foreign employees of foreign subsidiary companies. They can 
reflect the ability to control domestically foreign inventions and inflows of foreign 
technology from abroad.  
 
< Tables 8-10 go here > 
 
In what follows, we analyze the basic model for which cross-border patent is the 
dependent explanatory variable: 
(a)  L1_Import that are traded internationally have a negative impact on 
cross-border patents at the 1% level of significance. L1_Export have no 
significant impact on cross-border patents. Thus, international trade has 
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virtually no significant impact on innovation cooperation, with exports 
having no impact and imports hindering cross-border innovation cooperation. 
As most of the countries comprising the sample are high income and highly 
developed countries, most of the domestic enterprises are engaged in 
technology-intensive industries, and the knowledge or technology that can be 
learned through imports is limited. On the other hand, contact is made with 
foreign enterprises through exports, and in competition with them, 
cooperation in innovation is not enhanced. It can be seen that the impact of 
imports hindering innovation cooperation is greater than the zero impact of 
exports. 
(b)  Technology trade (L1_TP and L1_TR), which consists of directly exchanging 
knowledge and technology through licensing or purchases and sales between 
countries, is an important indicator to measure technology diffusion. The 
expenditure on technology trade and the income from technology trade, with 
each variable lagged one period, are positively and negatively correlated 
with patents, respectively, at the 1% level of significance. The volume of 
technology trade reflects the flows of technology, where greater expenditure 
on technology means the domestic country is more heavily engaged in 
investing in technology internationally, so that innovation cooperation will 
be encouraged. On the contrary, the larger is the income from technology 
trade, the more will countries accept the commissioning of invention work 
abroad. For this reason, there is a negative relationship with cross-border 
patents. However, regardless of whether they arise from income from 
technology trade or expenditure on technology trade, flows of technology are 
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always seen to exist. The coefficient of expenditure on technology trade is 
0.287, while that for income from technology trade is -0.447, with the 
magnitude of the positive effect on innovation being smaller than the 
negative effect. 
(c)  The impact of inward foreign direct investment on cross-border patents is 
significant, at -0.475 and -0.508 for fixed and random effects, respectively 
(see Table 8). 
(d)  The impact of outward foreign direct investment on cross-border patents is 
not significant. 
(e)  L1_GERD is positively correlated with patents at the 1% level of significance. 
This variable measures the country’s investment in R&D, and indicates 
whether investment in domestic R&D promotes innovation cooperation, and 
if the effect of the country’s investment in domestic R&D will be observed in 
the next period. 
(f)  The dummy variables that indicate a country’s membership in the OECD are not 
significant. 
 
5.2 Results for jointly-invented patent 
    The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of random effects, so that 
jointly-invented patents under the basic model are explained by fixed effects, as given in 
column (3) in Tables 8-10. Jointly-invented patents refer to the patents for which 
domestic inventors have cooperated jointly with at least one foreign inventor. As another 
approach to investigate patent cooperation, in what follows we analyze the basic model 
in which patents that are invented jointly with foreign countries are given as the 
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dependent variable: 
(a)  L1_Import and L1_Export have no significant effects on joint patents. As the 
sample of countries consists of mostly high income and advanced countries in 
terms of economic development, the products imported by such countries are 
primarily low technology-intensive products. When faced with countries with 
relatively low technology, the incentive to engage in innovation cooperation is 
comparatively small.  
(b)  Technology trade (L1_TP and L1_TR) exhibit positive and negative relationships, 
respectively, with innovation cooperation at the 10% and 1% levels of significance. 
Expenditure on technology trade denotes the extent to which the country 
domestically uses foreign technology, so that innovation cooperation exchanges 
between domestic and foreign research personnel are more frequent. In such 
circumstances, technology is disseminated internationally, but the income from 
technology trade leads to a significant reduction in innovation cooperation. The 
greater is the income from technology trade, the greater is the degree of domestic 
innovation, so there is a tendency for foreign countries to purchase the domestic 
country’s technology. For this reason, in the case of research personnel in countries 
owning a relatively large amount of technology, there is relatively little incentive 
for them to engage in innovation cooperation with foreign research personnel. The 
coefficient of expenditure on technology trade is 0.156, and the coefficient for 
income from foreign trade is -0.279. This also shows that the magnitude of the 
positive impact on innovation is smaller than that of the negative impact. 
(c)  The impact of inward foreign direct investment on joint patents is marginally 
significant (at -0.352 for random effects) (see Table 8).  
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(d)  The impact of outward foreign direct investment on joint patents is not 
significant. 
(e)  L1_GERD exhibits a positive relationship with innovation cooperation at the 1% 
level of significance. In order to promote innovation cooperation, it is necessary to 
promote investment by the domestic country in R&D, and the effect of investment 
in the current period will be felt in the following period.  
(f)  The dummy variables, indicating whether a country is a member of the OECD and 
engages in innovation cooperation, are not significant.  
Based on the above, cross-border patents are relatively more significantly 
influenced by foreign trade and technology trade. Both cross-border patents and 
jointly-invented patents are affected by domestic R&D expenditure, resulting in 
technology diffusion and an increase in innovation activities. For this reason, in the next 
section we decompose R&D expenditure by sector, and discuss the respective impacts of 
R&D expenditure of different sectors on innovation cooperation and innovation 
activities. 
 
5.3. Decomposition of R&D for Cross-border patents    
Tables 11-13 present the estimation results for the model in which R&D is 
decomposed. This model decomposes domestic R&D expenditure into corporate R&D 
expenditure, government department R&D expenditure, and higher education R&D 
expenditure, and each of the variables is lagged one period. In Tables 11-13, the 
dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are cross-border patents, and those in (3) and 
(4) are jointly-invented patents, though the discussion concentrates on cross-border 
patents. Equations (1) and (3) use the fixed effects model, while equations (2) and (4) 
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use the random effects model.  
The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis, so that the random effects 
model is used to describe the cross-border patents based on R&D expenditures 
decomposed by sector, as shown in Tables 11-13 (column 2). The assessment is given as 
follows: 
(a)  Corporate R&D expenditure and higher education R&D expenditure , each lagged 
one period, exhibit positive impacts on patents at the 5% significance level, while 
government R&D expenditure lagged one period has no impact on cross-border 
patents. As cross-border patents are essentially the result of innovation cooperation 
between the research personnel of domestic enterprises and of foreign subsidiaries, 
domestic R&D expenditure is affected by the enterprises’ corporate R&D 
expenditure. The more that an enterprise invests in R&D, the more it can learn 
about what it lacks. For this reason, through the foreign inventor’s ability to 
innovate, the domestic country’s technology can be encouraged to grow, and 
technology will flow to the domestic economy from abroad.  
(b)  Investment by countries in human capital is also important as enterprises that need 
highly-skilled talent in technology and knowledge have the ability to cooperate in 
innovating with foreign researchers. The coefficient for higher education R&D 
expenditure of 0.775 for random effects, and for corporate R&D expenditure is 
0.175 for random effects, indicating that the positive impact of the higher education 
on innovation cooperation is greater than the positive impact of corporate R&D 
expenditure.  
(c)  It is interesting to note that government expenditure on R&D is not significant, 
whereas government expenditure on higher education is significant. It would seem 
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to be important for governments to spend more on higher education than on its own 
R&D. 
 
5.4 The jointly-invented patents effect of R&D 
The Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis, so that jointly-invented 
patents may be explained using random effects based on the R&D model decomposed by 
sector, as shown in Tables 11-13 (column4). In what follows, the jointly invented patents 
with a foreign country will serve as the explanatory variable in the R&D model 
decomposed by sector. The estimated results of the analysis are given as follows: 
(a)  Corporate R&D expenditure lagged one period and government agency R&D 
expenditure are both insignificant, with higher education R&D expenditure 
exhibiting a positive impact on joint patents at the 1% level. Thus, when an 
inventor in the domestic country engages in innovation cooperation with a foreign 
inventor, expenditure on R&D will tend to be more concentrated in expenditure on 
R&D in higher education, reflecting the importance of education in human 
resources.  
(b)  As Mancusi (2008) observed, the extent to which knowledge and technology can be 
used depends on the ability to understand and interpret such knowledge and 
technology. In order to increase cooperation in innovation between foreign and 
domestic research personnel, it is necessary to raise the level of knowledge in the 
domestic country. It is important to note that government expenditure on higher 
education is highly significant, so that governments should continue to spend more 
on higher education than on its own R&D. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper used panel data for 40 countries for 1981-2008 and the negative 
binomial model for empirical estimation. We examined the diffusion of 
technology between countries through innovation cooperation and the extent of a 
country’s innovation. A basic model was used to examine the impact of imports, 
exports, expenditure on and income from technology trade, and expenditure on 
domestic R&D on innovation cooperation, and the extent of a country’s 
innovation. We also examined a country’s domestic R&D and expenditure 
decomposed into three sectors, namely corporate R&D expenditure, government 
agencies’ R&D expenditure, and higher education R&D expenditure.  
Each of the explanatory variables was based on the period before the joint 
and cross-border patents were observed. Patent cooperation was used as a proxy 
variable for technology diffusion, where the analysis of patent cooperation 
proceeded with two novel types of variables for patents, namely cross-border 
patents and jointly-invented patents. As these patents differ from each other, by 
definition, the directions of their technology diffusion can also differ. 
In what follows, we define the novel data used for their kinds of patent 
cooperation used in the paper. As the countries of residence of the patent owner 
and the inventor of the patent are described in detail in the patent document, we 
can track the direction of the flow of technology. The cross-border patent is 
defined as a patent by an inventor in a foreign country and owned domestically, 
indicating that the patent owner is in the local country and the inventor in a 
foreign country. It can be inferred that the direction of the flow of the technology 
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is from the foreign country to the domestic country. A jointly-invented patent is 
defined as a patent where an inventor in the local country invents the patent 
jointly with at least one foreign inventor. It can be inferred that the direction of 
the flow of the technology is in both directions. For this reason, depending on the 
direction of the flow of technology, in accordance with the empirical results 
obtained we have the following conclusions: 
 
(a) Technology flows from the foreign country to the domestic country:  
1. Expenditure on technology trade in the previous period each promote inflows 
of technology into the domestic country from abroad. However, imports and 
income from technology trade in the previous period tend to hinder inflows 
of foreign technology from abroad. Inward foreign direct investment also has 
a negative impact on cross-border patents. 
2. If a country wants technology to flow into the domestic economy from 
abroad, the local economy should increase its investment in corporate R&D 
and higher education R&D. If an enterprise pays considerable attention to 
innovative development, it is bound to promote innovation by the employees 
of its subsidiaries, which will then cause foreign knowledge to flow into the 
domestic economy. Consequently, the domestic enterprises will gain from 
innovation, and this outcome will generally occur one period after the 
investment in R&D occurs. 
 
(b) Technology flows in both directions: 
1. Expenditure on technology trade lagged one period will promote the bilateral 
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diffusion of technology. However, imports lagged one period and income 
from technology trade lagged one period will hinder the bilateral diffusion of 
technology. Inward foreign direct investment also has a negative impact on 
joint patents. 
2. In order to promote the bilateral diffusion of technology, investment in 
higher education R&D should be bolstered because cooperation requires 
incentives. The domestic country’s research personnel need to reach a certain 
level of knowledge if they are to entice foreign inventors to engage in 
innovative cooperation with their own inventors to achieve a mutually 
beneficial outcome.  
3. Government expenditure on higher education is highly significant,  so 
governments should continue to spend more on higher education than on its 
own R&D. 
Finally, based on the above, the following recommendations are offered for 
future research, and for countries to formulate policies to promote the 
development of technology: 
(a)  Patents can serve as a proxy variable for innovation, and different types of 
patents can be used in research. According to the different  definitions of 
patents and the ways in which innovation activities are conducted, different 
types of results can be analyzed. Cross-border patents can be used to analyze 
the inflow of foreign technology into a country, while jointly-invented 
patents can be used to analyze bilateral flows of technology. 
(b)  In terms of public and private policy, countries should focus on investment in 
higher education research and on foreign technology trade. Regardless of 
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whether it is knowledge or technology, both are created by inventors, and the 
positive external effects caused by inflows of technology will depend on a 
country’s ability to understand knowledge and technology.  
(c)  Income from technology trade will promote a country’s engagement in 
innovation, while expenditure on technology trade will promote innovation 
cooperation between the domestic country and foreign countries. In short, the 
more frequent are the flows of technology, the greater will that innovative 
behavior be encouraged within the home country. 
In summary, if it is desired to shift from foreign to domestic technology, it is 
necessary to increase expenditure on R&D for business enterprises and higher 
education, exports and technology. If the focus is on increasing bilateral 
technology diffusion, it is necessary to increase expenditure on R&D for higher 
education and technology. It is also found that outward direct investment has no 
significant impact on either joint or cross-border patents, whereas inward foreign 
direct investment has a significant negative impact on cross-border patents but no 
impact on joint patents. As government expenditure on higher education is highly 
significant, governments should continue to spend more on higher education than 
on its own R&D.
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Table 1. Countries 
 OECD member countries 
Non-OECD 
member 
countries 
Total 
 
Original Members in 
1961 
Members after 
1961 
  
Asia Turkey 
Japan (1964), 
Korea (1996), 
Israel (2010) 
China, Russia, 
Singapore, 
Taiwan 
8 
Europe 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Britain 
Finland (1969) , 
Poland (1996), 
Slovakia 2000), 
Slovenia (2010), 
Czech Republic 
(1995), Hungary 
(1996) 
Romania 25 
Oceania  
Australia (1971) , 
New Zealand 
(1973) 
 1 
America Canada, United States 
Chile (2010), 
Mexico (1994) 
Argentina 5 
Africa   South Africa 1 
Total 20 13 7 40 
 
Source: OECD 
Note：() is the entry date of countries to the OECD. 
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 Table 2. Variables 
Dependent Variable 
Cross-border 
Patent 
The number of patents owned by the home country that were 
invented by foreign inventors 
Joint Patent 
The number of patents in which the domestic inventor 
invented the patent with at least one foreign inventor 
Explanatory Variables 
Import Imports divided by GDP  
Export Exports divided by GDP  
FDI_in Inward Foreign Direct Investment divided by GDP 
FDI_out Outward Foreign Direct Investment divided by GDP 
TP Expenditure on technology trade divided by GERD  
TR Income from technology trade divided by GERD  
GERD Gross domestic expenditure on R&D divided by GDP (%) 
BERD 
Business enterprise expenditure on R&D divided by GDP 
(%) 
GOVERD 
Government intramural expenditure on R&D divided by 
GDP (%) 
HERD Higher education expenditure on R&D divided by GDP (%) 
OECD Dummy variable (OECD =1 for OECD members) 
Notes 
L1, L2, L3 1-year, 2-year and 3-year time lags 
Source: OECD (2008), Compendium of patent statistics. 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
 
Variables Mean 
Standard 
error 
Min Max 
Sample 
size 
 Cross-border   
Patents 
3144.242 12279.97 0 114746 1120 
 Joint  
Patents 
3255.079 12171.3 0 114333 1120 
 
Import 0.3912 0.2928 0.0463 2.1249 1070 
Export 0.4057 0.3265 0.0660 2.3435 1070 
TP 0.5702 1.1649 0.0062 11.1008 577 
TR 0.4258 1.2219 0.0011 13.7397 574 
FDI_in 0.2544 0.3018 0 1.8826 1016 
FDI_out 0.1845 0.2514 0.0003 2.0009 1005 
GERD 0.0160 0.0088 0.0015 0.0483 799 
GOVERD 0.0025 0.0012 0.0002 0.0075 782 
BERD 0.0098 0.0070 0.0001 0.0390 792 
HERD 0.0033 0.0018 0.00004 0.0084 781 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Zero Observations 
 Cross- border patents  Joint patents 
Zero values 35 24 
Observations 1,120 1,120 
Share of zeros 0.031 0.021 
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Table 5. Correlation Coefficients 
 
Dependent  
Variable  
Joint Cross-border Imports Exports TP TR FDI_in FDI_out GERD 
Joint 1 
        
Cross-border 0.995 1 
       
Independent  
Variable  
         
Imports -0.285 -0.281 1 
      
Exports  -0.278 -0.275 0.987 1 
     
TP -0.158 -0.155 0.549 0.555 1 
    
TR -0.081 -0.081 0.262 0.286 0.864 1 
   
FDI_in -0.163 -0.161 0.850 0.856 0.582 0.378 1 
  
FDI_out -0.053 -0.057 0.578 0.621 0.377 0.369 0.775 1 
 
GERD 0.398 0.394 -0.056 -0.0002 -0.130 0.014 -0.014 0.294 1 
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Table 6. Lag Structure of R&D for Cross-border Patents 
 
 Cross-border patents 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Variable  (1)  (3)  (5)  (2)  (4)  (6) 
L1_TP 
0.240 
(0.098)** 
0.173 
(0.108) 
0.242 
(0.101)** 
0.241 
(0.098)** 
0.168 
(0.107) 
0.237 
(0.101)** 
L1_TR 
-0.369 
(0.117)*** 
-0.319 
(0.126)** 
-0.378 
(0.123)*** 
-0.346 
(0.114)*** 
-0.287 
(0.121)** 
-0.348 
(0.119)*** 
FDI_in 
-0.475 
(0.207)** 
-0.332 
(0.222) 
-0.551 
(0.222)** 
-0.508 
(0.206)** 
-0.356 
(0.221) 
-0.576 
(0.221)*** 
FDI_out 
0.142 
(0.184) 
-0.031 
(0.209) 
0.047 
(0.199) 
0.141 
(0.181) 
-0.039 
(0.206) 
0.040 
(0.197) 
L1_GERD 
0.195 
(0.055)*** 
 
 
 
 
0.218 
(0.054)*** 
 
 
 
 
L2_GERD 
 
 
0.131 
(0.061)** 
 
 
 
 
0.156 
(0.060)*** 
 
 
L3_GERD 
 
 
 
 
0.156 
(0.060)*** 
 
 
 
 
0.179 
(0.059)*** 
OECD 
0.037 
(0.188) 
-0.092 
(0.200) 
-0.116 
(0.204) 
0.098 
(0.185) 
-0.013 
(0.198) 
-0.032 
(0.202) 
Constant 
1.149 
(0.197)*** 
1.443 
(0.210)*** 
1.436 
(0.214)*** 
1.054 
(0.197)*** 
1.326 
(0.211)*** 
1.318 
(0.215)*** 
Log 
likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3361.32 
 
27.57 
0.000 
-2885.15 
 
20.46 
0.002 
-3008.90 
 
29.68 
0.000 
-3735.62 
 
30.56 
0.000 
-3238.27 
 
20.92 
0.002 
-3368.18 
 
30.16 
0.000 
Observations 534 460 480 534 460 480 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Lag Structure of R&D for Joint Patents 
 
 Joint patents 
 Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Variable  (1)  (3)  (5)  (2)  (4)  (6) 
L1_TP 
0.146 
(0.086)
* 
0.077 
(0.092) 
0.156 
(0.087)* 
0.149 
(0.086
)* 
0.078 
(0.092) 
0.156 
(0.087)* 
L1_TR 
-0.216 
(0.096)
** 
-0.156 
(0.098) 
-0.225 
(0.100)** 
-0.206 
(0.092
)** 
-0.143 
(0.094) 
-0.221 
(0.096)** 
L1_FDI_in 
-0.302 
(0.212) 
-0.126 
(0.227) 
-0.341 
(0.222) 
-0.352 
(0.209
)* 
-0.170 
(0.225) 
-0.383 
(0.220)* 
L1_FDI_out 
-0.029 
(0.198) 
-0.216 
(0.224) 
-0.117 
(0.213) 
-0.009 
(0.193
) 
-0.198 
(0.218) 
-0.103 
(0.208) 
L1_GERD 
0.176 
(0.052)
*** 
  
0.201 
(0.051
)*** 
  
L2_GERD  
0.113 
(0.057)** 
  
0.140 
(0.056)** 
 
L3_GERD   
0.117 
(0.056)** 
  
0.143 
(0.555)** 
OECD 
-0.059 
(0.174) 
-0.169 
(0.181) 
-0.168 
(0.184) 
-0.001 
(0.170
) 
-0.096 
(0.177) 
-0.089 
(0.181) 
Constant 
1.431 
(0.186)
*** 
1.613 
(0.195)**
* 
1.618 
(0.199)*** 
1.250 
(0.184
)*** 
1.505 
(0.194)**
* 
1.505 
(0.197)**
* 
Log- 
likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3529.
44 
 
19.83 
0.003 
-3035.23 
 
14.78 
0.022 
-3163.72 
 
21.04 
0.002 
-3913.
27 
 
23.40 
0.000 
-3398.20 
 
15.93 
0.014 
-3533.41 
 
22.06 
0.001 
Observations 534 460 480 534 460 480 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Effects of Cross-border Patents and Joint Patents (under GERD) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
Variable 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import   
 
 
L1_Export   
 
 
L1_TP 
0.240 
(0.098)** 
0.241 
(0.098)** 
0.146 
(0.086)* 
0.149 
(0.086)* 
L1_TR 
-0.369 
(0.117)*** 
-0.346 
(0.114)*** 
-0.216 
(0.096)** 
-0.206 
(0.092)*** 
L1_FDI_in 
-0.475 
(0.207)** 
-0.508 
(0.206)** 
-0.302 
(0.212) 
-0.352 
(0.209)* 
L1_FDI_out 
0.142 
(0.184) 
0.141 
(0.181) 
-0.029 
(0.198) 
-0.009 
(0.193) 
L1_GERD 
0.195 
(0.055)*** 
0.218 
(0.054)*** 
0.173 
(0.052)*** 
0.201 
(0.051)*** 
OECD 
0.037 
(0.188) 
0.098 
(0.185) 
-0.059 
(0.174) 
-0.001 
(0.170) 
Constants 
1.149 
(0.197)*** 
1.054 
(0.197)*** 
1.431 
(0.186)*** 
1.250 
(0.184)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3361.32 
27.57 
0.000 
-3008.90 
29.68 
0.000 
-3735.62 
30.56 
0.000 
-3913.27 
23.40 
0.000 
Hausman Test  
Prob> chi2 
 -1.60  16.53 
Observations 534 534  534 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Effects of Cross-border Patents and Joint Patents (under GERD) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
Variable 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import 
-0.739 
(0.318)** 
-0.837 
(0.318)*** 
-0.246 
(0.286) 
-0.373 
(0.288) 
L1_Export     
L1_TP 
0.254 
(0.103)** 
0.264 
(0.102)** 
0.133 
(0.092) 
0.149 
(0.093) 
L1_TR 
-0.377 
(0.123)*** 
-0.359 
(0.121)*** 
-0.207 
(0.101)** 
-0.202 
(0.097)** 
L1_FDI_in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
L1_FDI_out 
-0.011 
(0.168) 
-0.009 
(0.168) 
-0.185 
(0.159) 
-0.169 
(0.158) 
L1_GERD 
0.201 
(0.055)*** 
0.226 
(0.054)*** 
0.177 
(0.052)*** 
0.204 
(0.051)*** 
OECD 
0.033 
(0.189) 
0.098 
(0.186) 
-0.063 
(0.176) 
-0.009 
(0.171) 
Constants 
1.323 
(0.218)*** 
1.252 
(0.216)*** 
1.393 
(0.202)*** 
1.332 
(0.198)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3360.95 
27.39 
0.000 
-3734.83 
30.90 
0.000 
-3530.04 
18.35 
0.005 
-3913.76 
22.11 
0.001 
Hausman Test  
Prob> chi2 
48.52***   -12.52 
Observations 534 534 534 534 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Effects of Cross-border Patents and Joint Patents (under GERD) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
Variable 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import 
 
 
   
L1_Export 
-0.290 
(0.263) 
-0.325 
(0.263) 
-0.098 
(0.238) 
-0.156 
(0.237) 
L1_TP 
0.197 
(0.100)** 
0.196 
(0.100)** 
0.110 
(0.090) 
0.114 
(0.091) 
L1_TR 
-0.355 
(0.121)*** 
-0.332 
(0.119)*** 
-0.198 
(0.100)** 
-0.188 
(0.096)** 
L1_FDI_in     
L1_FDI_out 
-0.087 
(0.164) 
-0.097 
(0.163) 
-0.214 
(0.160) 
-0.210 
(0.158) 
L1_GERD 
0.197 
(0.055)*** 
0.221 
(0.055)*** 
0.175 
(0.052)*** 
0.201 
(0.051)*** 
OECD 
0.055 
(0.190) 
0.115 
(0.186) 
-0.057 
(0.176) 
-0.003 
(0.171) 
Constants 
1.187 
(0.215)*** 
1.100 
(0.213)*** 
1.351 
(0.198)*** 
1.274 
(0.195)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3363.24 
23.58 
0.000 
-3737.77 
26.05 
0.000 
-3530.33 
17.82 
0.007 
-3914.41 
20.93 
0.002 
Hausman Test  
Prob> chi2 
 -52.95  -38.47 
Observations 534 534 534 534 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Effects of Cross Patents and Joint Patents (Decomposition of R&D) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import     
L1_Export     
L1_TP 
0.281 
(0.097)*** 
0.284 
(0.096)*** 
0.202 
(0.082)** 
0.207 
(0.082)** 
L1_TR 
-0.425 
(0.120)*** 
-0.398 
(0.117)*** 
-0.306 
(0.100)*** 
-0.287 
(0.096)*** 
L1_FDI_in 
-0.504 
(0.214)** 
-0.541 
(0.213)** 
-0.390 
(0.221)* 
-0.441 
(0.218)** 
L1_FDI_out 
0.128 
(0.189) 
0.129 
(0.187) 
-0.065 
(0.204) 
-0.052 
(0.199) 
L1_BERD 
0.135 
(0.078)* 
0.149 
(0.077)* 
0.023 
(0.074) 
0.046 
(0.073) 
L1_GOVERD 
-0.100 
（0.425）  
0.218 
(0.421) 
0.076 
(0.383) 
0.152 
(0.378) 
L1_HERD 
0.736 
(0.336)** 
0.817 
(0.331)** 
1.277 
(0.299)*** 
1.320 
(0.295)*** 
OECD 
-0.029 
(0.197) 
0.026 
(0.194) 
-0.159 
(0.181) 
-0.099 
(0.176) 
Constant 
1.100 
(0.221)*** 
0.974 
(0.222)*** 
1.284 
(0.207)*** 
1.172 
(0.206)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3228.23 
29.88 
0.000 
-3610.97 
33.15 
0.000 
-3391.82 
34.37 
0.000 
-3374.14 
37.89 
0.000 
Hausman Test 
 
Prob> chi2 
 -42.22 32.05***  
Observation 515 515 515 515 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12. Effects of Cross Patents and Joint Patents (Decomposition of R&D) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import 
-0.836 
(0.330)** 
-0.822 
(0.328)** 
-0.313 
(0.293) 
-0.419 
(0.294) 
L1_Export     
L1_TP 
0.297 
(0.104)*** 
0.385 
(0.109)*** 
0.188 
(0.089)** 
0.202 
(0.090)** 
L1_TR 
-0.438 
(0.128)*** 
-0.433 
(0.122)*** 
-0.307 
(0.108)*** 
-0.292 
(0.106)*** 
L1_FDI_in     
L1_FDI_out 
-0.040 
(0.175) 
0.233 
(0.201) 
--0.267 
(0.168) 
-0.264 
(0.168) 
L1_BERD 
0.170 
(0.077)** 
0.175 
(0.076)** 
0.041 
(0.075) 
0.068 
(0.074) 
L1_GOVERD 
-0.109 
(0.440) 
0.045 
(0.431) 
-0.024 
(0.391) 
0.044 
(0.387) 
L1_HERD 
0.618 
(0.336)* 
0.775 
(0.328)** 
1.216 
(0.302)*** 
1.250 
(0.298)*** 
OECD 
-0.015 
(0.197) 
-0.003 
(0.193) 
-0.159 
(0.182) 
-0.102 
(0.177) 
Constant 
1.365 
(0.252)*** 
1.268 
(0.250)*** 
1.376 
(0.228)*** 
1.292 
(0.225)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3237.48 
29.62 
0.000 
-3607.61 
37.84 
0.000 
-3392.74 
31.06 
0.000 
-3775.03 
34.38 
0.000 
Hausman Test 
 
Prob> chi2 
 3.97  13.51 
Observation 515 515 515 515 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 13. Effects of Cross Patents and Joint Patents (Decomposition of R&D) 
 Cross-border Patents Joint Patents 
 
Fixed 
Effects 
(1) 
Random 
Effects 
(2) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(3) 
Random 
Effects 
(4) 
L1_Import  
 
 
  
L1_Export 
-0.327 
(0.272) 
-0.348 
(0.271) 
-0.120 
(0.241) 
-0.159 
(0.241) 
L1_TP 
0.235 
(0.101)** 
0.235 
(0.100)** 
0.158 
(0.087)* 
0.160 
(0.875)* 
L1_TR 
-0.411 
(0.126)*** 
-0.384 
(0.123)*** 
-0.293 
(0.106)*** 
-0.272 
(0.103)*** 
L1_FDI_in     
L1_FDI_out 
0.110 
(0.170) 
-0.122 
(0.171) 
-0.300 
(0.168)* 
-0.308 
(0.168)* 
L1_BERD 
0.157 
(0.079)** 
0.171 
(0.077)** 
0.036 
(0.076) 
0.060 
(0.074) 
L1_GOVERD 
-0.016 
(0.436) 
0.144 
(0.432) 
0.016 
(0.388) 
0.090 
(0.384) 
L1_HERD 
0.635 
(0.341)* 
0.713 
(0.337)** 
1.220 
(0.303)*** 
1.257 
(0.299)*** 
OECD 
0.000 
(0.198) 
0.055 
(0.194) 
-0.152 
(0.183) 
-0.096 
(0.177) 
Constant 
1.174 
(0.246)*** 
1.049 
(0.245)*** 
1.310 
(0.223)*** 
1.210 
(0.221)*** 
Log-likelihood 
Wald chi2 
Prob > chi2 
-3240.20 
25.12 
0.002 
-3613.26 
27.65 
0.000 
-3393.20 
30.36 
0.000 
-3775.87 
33.09 
0.000 
Hausman Test 
 
Prob> chi2 
 -287.13  8.07 
Observation 515 515 515 515 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
